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Religious Freedom in Germany 
Gerhard Robbers ∗  
I. INTRODUCTION 
At least from a U.S. perspective, religious freedom in Germany 
has become a matter of concern in recent years.1 It may well be time 
to reconsider the law and the facts of religious life in a country under 
scrutiny due to its twentieth-century history. Upholding religious 
freedom is a key issue in any community committed to the idea of 
human rights. After the end of the devastating rule of national-
socialism, Germany reestablished its long-standing cultural history in 
which it had intensively contributed to the development of human 
rights. The purpose of this article is to describe the various normative 
sources of religious freedom in Germany and to establish an 
understanding of religious freedom as a positive freedom in harmony 
with the legitimate culture of the people concerned. 
II. THE NORMATIVE SYSTEM 
A. Constitutional Provisions 
Religious freedom has a prominent place in Germany’s 
constitution.2 Freedom of religion is protected before many other 
 
 ∗ Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Trier, Germany. Professor Robbers is the 
Director of the Institute for European Constitutional Law and a judge at the Administrative 
Court of Appeals Rhineland-Palatine. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the 
European Consortium for Church-State Research and is also a member of the OSCE Board of 
Experts on Religious Freedom. He is the managing co-editor of Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 
and editor of STATE AND CHURCH IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (1997). 
 1. See, e.g., BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: GERMANY (Sept. 
5, 2000) (visited Mar. 15, 2001) <http://www.state.gov/www/ global/human_rights/irf/ 
irf_rpt/irf_germany.html> [hereinafter U.S. STATE DEP’T 2000 REPORT]. 
 2. Religious freedom is guaranteed in Article 4 of the German Constitution, which 
translates as follows: 
I. Freedom of belief and of conscience and freedom of creed, religious or 
ideological, are inviolable. 
II. The undisturbed practice of religion shall be guaranteed. 
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freedoms. Only human dignity,3 freedom and life,4 and equal 
protection5 are human rights placed before religious freedom in 
Germany’s constitution. Religious freedom under the German 
constitution means freedom of belief and freedom to act according 
to one’s beliefs. The constitution secures religious freedom for both 
individuals and collective bodies. 
The various freedoms guaranteed for religious institutions in 
Germany can be found in the German constitution, in the 
constitutions of the German Länder and in ordinary laws, and in the 
various treaties between the state and specific religions.6 In addition 
to the central guarantee of religious freedom, the constitution offers 
additional religious rights and institutional guarantees for churches 
and religious communities. According to Article 3 of the 
constitution, no one shall be prejudiced or favored because of his 
faith or religion.7 This guarantee is specified for civil rights, public 
office, and public service.8 Article 4 provides for the right to refrain 
from military service in the name of religion.9 Article 7 guarantees 
religious instruction in public schools and includes the right to 
abstain from that instruction.10 Article 7 also secures the right to 
establish and to run religiously or ideologically based private 
schools.11 
Several far-reaching institutional guarantees for churches and 
other religious communities referred to in the German constitution12 
have been incorporated from the German Reich’s Weimar 
constitution of 1919 (“WRV”).13 The most important provisions are 
 
III. No one may be compelled against his conscience into military service involving 
armed combat. Details shall be regulated by federal law. 
GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 4 (F.R.G.). 
 3. GG art. 1. 
 4. GG art. 2. 
 5. GG art. 3. 
 6. All sixteen Länder (i.e., states) of the Federal Republic of Germany have their own 
constitutions, most of which contain guarantees of fundamental rights including religious 
freedom. 
 7. GG art. 3(III). 
 8. GG art. 33(III). See also GG art. 140; WEIMARER REICHSVERFASSUNG [Consti-
tution of the Weimar Republic] [WRV] art. 136. 
 9. GG art. 4(III), 12a(II), (III). 
 10. GG art. 7(II), (III). 
 11. GG art. 7(IV), (V). 
 12. GG art. 140. 
 13. WRV arts. 136–39 & 141. 
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as follows: there shall be no state church, i.e., no established 
church;14 all religious communities shall enjoy the right to self-
determination,15 the status of certain religious communities as public 
corporations,16 equal rights to associations that foster a non-
religious, philosophical creed,17 the guarantee of Sundays and feast-
days,18 and chaplainry in public institutions.19 
The preamble to the German constitution also describes 
Germany’s commitment to religious freedom. It states: “Conscious 
of their responsibility before God and humankind, animated by the 
resolve to serve world peace as an equal part of a united Europe, the 
German people have adopted, by virtue of their constituent power, 
this Basic Law.”20 The reference to God and humankind ac-
knowledges responsibility for the crimes committed during national-
socialism and responsibility to prevent a repetition of those events in 
Germany. This reference to God does not allude to nor establish any 
specific religious belief.21 Rather, by referring to God, the preamble 
acknowledges a sphere of transcendence, indicating a borderline for 
the state—that is, a field beyond the reach of the state. It suggests 
that there is something other than the political order established by 
the constitution, that the state is not all-powerful. The preamble is 
anti-totalitarian. 
B. Other Textual Sources of Religious Freedom 
Religious freedom in Germany is rooted as well in texts other 
than the constitution, such as the Länder constitutions, agreements 
between the government and specific religious organizations, and 
case law. The Länder are responsible for most competencies in 
matters of religion, churches, and other religious communities. 
Länder constitutions and ordinary laws govern the concrete shape of 
 
 14. WRV art. 137(I). 
 15. WRV art. 137(III). 
 16. WRV art. 137(V). 
 17. Weltanschaungsgemeinschaften [non-religious philosophical organizations]; WRV 
art. 137(VII). 
 18. WRV art. 139. 
 19. WRV art. 141. 
 20. GG preamble. 
 21. See Christian Starck, Präambel, No. 36, in 1 DAS BONNER GRUNDGESETZ, KOM-
MENTAR [THE BONN CONSTITUTION, COMMENTARY] (Hans von Mangoldt et al. eds., 
1999). 
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the regime of church-state relations and religious freedom in 
Germany. They do so in a variety of ways, all rich in detail and 
diversity.22 The basic, and sometimes controversial, features of this 
system include the legal status of churches and other religious 
communities, the church tax, religious instruction in public schools, 
and the right to self-determination. Many details of the German 
system of religious freedom are being laid down in agreements 
between the state and a considerable number of religious 
communities.23 Through these agreements, the specific needs of 
various religious communities can be adequately accommodated. As 
for the influence of case law, the jurisdiction of the courts regarding 
church-state issues is vast.24 Despite a number of questionable 
decisions, German courts and the administration are generally 
favorably disposed toward religion and religious communities, 
accepting them as an integral part of society. 
III. THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW ON RELIGION: FREEDOM, 
STATE NEUTRALITY, AND EQUAL TREATMENT 
The sources of the law on religion as discussed above may be 
categorized into three basic ideas: freedom, state neutrality, and 
equal treatment. These underlying ideas are undoubtedly interlinked. 
Additional principles, such as tolerance, also figure into their 
implementation. To state these basic ideas does not amount to 
structuring a theory, but merely to identify some of the most 
predominant leading categories. 
Religious freedom is fully understood only as a positive freedom. 
State neutrality is in harmony with the special status of religions, as 
well as with religious instruction in public schools, and it requires far 
reaching self-determination of religious institutions. Equal treatment 
 
 22. See AXEL FREIHERR VON CAMPENHAUSEN, STAATSKIRCHENRECHT: EIN STUDIEN-
BUCH [CIVIL ECCLESIASTICAL LAW: A HANDBOOK] (3d ed. 1996). See generally Heiner 
Marré, Das kirchliche Besteuerungsrecht [Church Taxation Law], in 1 HANDBUCH DES STAATS-
KIRCHENRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [HANDBOOK OF CIVIL ECCLES-
IASTICAL LAW IN GERMANY] 1101 (Joseph Listl & Dietrich Pirson eds., 2d ed. 1994); BERND 
JEAND’HEUR & STEFAN KORIOTH, GRUNDZÜGE DES STAATSKIRCHENRECHTS [PRINCIPLES 
OF CIVIL ECCLESIASTICAL LAW] (2000). 
 23. See DIE KONKORDATE UND KIRCHENVERTRÄGE IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUT-
SCHLAND [CONCORDATS AND CHURCH CONTRACTS IN GERMANY] (Joseph Listl ed., 1987). 
 24. For a more complete reference to recent German (and French) court decisions in 
matters of religion, see the database at <http://www.uni-trier.de/~ievr> (visited Feb. 15, 
2001). 
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requires awareness of the specific needs of different religions. These 
principles and their adequate interpretation rest in underlying 
cultural convictions rooted in Germany’s cultural history. 
A. Religious Freedom 
The primary idea of freedom means that all religious creeds are 
tolerated and free to flourish. In addition to mere toleration, the 
German political system supports the idea of positive freedom. While 
government must not forbid certain beliefs nor discriminate against 
them, it must also go further to create a positive atmosphere of 
tolerance within society. In this context, one may mention the 
problems there were some time ago with the Church of Scientology, 
or, on quite a different level, shameful ongoing attacks on Jewish 
institutions, even if not directly rooted in religious prejudice. The 
legal framework embodied in the basic idea of positive religious 
freedom must give ample room for the exercise of religious beliefs. 
Pursuant to this idea of positive religious freedom, the Federal 
Constitutional Court decided, for example, that the general 
association law of Germany must be interpreted in a manner 
compatible with the specific religious needs of the Bahá’í.25 The 
general interpretation of the law on associations normally requires 
each registered association to have a legally independent board of 
governors. The Court held that the local associations of the Bahá’í, 
because of religious liberty, are free to formally affiliate themselves 
with one national board of governors. 
In recognition of the importance of religious freedom, 
Germany’s constitution mandates that laws that limit religious 
freedom comply with special requirements. Other freedoms, like the 
freedom of association or the free exercise of one’s profession, can be 
limited by laws protecting any legitimate public interest and 
complying with other constitutional standards like proportionality, 
certainty, or the protection of reasonable trust. Religious freedom 
cannot be limited by just any law purporting to protect the public 
interest. It can only be limited by a law that enforces public interests 
laid down in the Constitution itself.26 These limits should be 
interpreted narrowly, thereby respecting the importance of religious 
 
 25. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Decisions of the Federal Consti-
tutional Court] [hereinafter BVerfGE] 83, 341. 
 26. BVerfGE 32, 98 (107). 
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freedom. Thus, an optimal balance has to be found respecting both 
religious freedom and other legitimate public interests. 
The Federal Administrative Court has recently weighed religious 
freedoms against public interests to decide whether students and 
teachers may participate in religious traditions that may interfere with 
public school regulations. In one instance, the Federal Admin-
istrative Court allowed a female Islamic student in public school to 
opt out of otherwise compulsory coeducational sports classes, such as 
coeducational swimming. Her religious belief prescribed certain 
dressing rules for girls incompatible with the normal level of 
coeducational sports involvement.27 In addition, Islamic pupils can 
obtain leave from school for certain high Islamic religious holidays.28 
Female Islamic pupils are also permitted to exercise their right to 
religious freedom by wearing religious head scarves in school; 
apparently this creates no legal problems nor public concern in 
Germany. However, the issue of whether an Islamic public school 
teacher can wear a religious scarf poses the question of whether or 
not this interferes with the public schools’ obligation to maintain 
religious neutrality. There are two cases pending before courts on 
the matter. The Administrative Court in Stuttgart decided that the 
duty of religious neutrality in school prevails over the religious rights 
of the teacher.29 By contrast, the Administrative Court in Lüneburg 
decided that the teacher’s right to religious freedom prevails.30 Both 
cases are now pending before higher courts. 
The decisive question in both of the above-mentioned cases is 
probably not that of religious freedom. It is instead the ability of the 
individual teacher to ensure neutrality of public school education and 
not to indoctrinate children. If teachers are able to abstain from 
indoctrinating the children, the teacher should be allowed to wear 
her head scarf, as is known to be the practice in Northrhine-
Westfalia. 
 
 27. Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts [Decisions of the Federal Adminis-
trative Court] [hereinafter BVerwGE] 94, 82. 
 28. See Answer of the Federal Government to the Question of the Fraction of 
CDU/CSU, Bundestags-Drucksache [Federal Parliament-Printed Document] [hereinafter BT-
Drs.] 14/4530 (08.11.2000) [Nov. 8, 2000]. 
 29. Verwaltungsgericht [Administrative Court] [hereinafter VG] Stuttgart, NVwZ 
[NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR VERWALTUNGSRECHT/NEW J. FOR ADMIN. L.] 959 (2000). 
 30. VG Lüneburg, NJW [NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT/NEW LEGAL WKLY.] 
707 (2001). 
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B. Neutrality 
The second category of Germany’s law on religion is neutrality. 
Neutrality embraces the principles of non-identification and non-
intervention. From the principle of non-identification it follows that 
there is no established church in Germany.31 Religious communities 
are either organized as private associations or as corporations under 
public law. There is no special register for religious communities in 
Germany. A manifestation of non-intervention is that the govern-
ment guarantees far reaching self-determination of religious com-
munities. 
1. Public law status 
Germany retains neutrality in part by not maintaining an 
established state church. The basic elements for legally organizing a 
church are outlined in Article 140 of the Constitution. It provides 
that religious societies shall remain corporations under public law 
insofar as they have enjoyed that status in the past.32 Other religious 
societies shall be granted the same rights upon application if their 
constitution and the number of their members give assurance of 
their permanency. 
Granting churches and other religious communities legal status 
as corporations under public law does not incorporate them into the 
state hierarchy.33 On the contrary, it is a status sui generis (“in a class 
of its own”). Each religious community that gives some assurance of 
its permanency and its loyalty to the law34 can obtain this status as a 
public corporation. In fact, many various religious communities are 
organized as public law corporations in the various Länder. The two 
largest churches in Germany, the Catholic and the Protestant 
Church, each of which comprises about twenty-seven million 
members,35 are both public law corporations. So are Jewish cult 
 
 31. WRV art. 137(I); GG art. 140. 
 32. WRV art. 137(V); GG art. 140. 
 33. BVerfGE 18, 385 (386); BVerfGE 30, 415 (428); BVerfGE 42, 312 (332); 
BVerfGE 66, 1 (19). 
 34. See WRV art. 137(V); GG art. 140. 
 35. As of 1997, the population of Germany was estimated at 82 million. Of this, there 
are approximately 27.4 million Catholics, 27.4 million Protestants, 3 million Muslims, 1 
million Orthodox, 150,000 Jews, 140,000 Buddhists, 66,000 Hindus, 5000 Bahái’í, 2 million 
members of numerous smaller religious communities, and 21 million of no religious 
membership. The data for some religious communities is rather uncertain; in recent years there 
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communities, the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the Baptist Church, the Christ-
Catholics, the New Apostolic Church, the Anglican Church, a 
number of Orthodox Churches, Pentecostal Communities, Christian 
Science, the Mennonites, the Methodist Church, and the Salvation 
Army. A number of philosophical, non-religious communities such 
as the Alliance for Spiritual Freedom or the Humanist Community 
are also public law corporations.36 
Whether Jehovah’s Witnesses should obtain the status of public 
corporation is now pending again before the Federal Administrative 
Court. In its first decision, the Court, contrary to the lower courts, 
decided that a religious or philosophical community must be “loyal 
to the State” to achieve the status of a public law corporation.37 This 
element was somewhat of a surprise addition to the requirements 
generally recognized by law and jurisprudence to achieve this status. 
Moreover, the Court held that Jehovah’s Witnesses did not meet this 
requirement because Jehovah’s Witnesses, as a compelling precept of 
faith, denied the active and passive right of their members to vote in 
democratic state elections. Although there is no individual legal duty 
in Germany to vote, the denial of participation in public elections 
would undermine part of the basic principles of democratic order. 
The Federal Constitutional Court vacated the judgment and 
remanded the case to the Federal Administrative Court.38 The 
Federal Constitutional Court held that loyalty to the state is not 
requisite to obtaining public law status for a religious community. A 
religious community applying to become a corporation under public 
law must, however, be loyal to the law. It must guarantee that it will 
observe the law and that it will exercise its rights in accordance with 
the constitution and other laws. Furthermore, it must guarantee that 
its future conduct will not endanger the fundamental principles of 
 
has been strong Jewish immigration from eastern countries. See STATISTISCHES JAHRBUCH 
FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [STATISTICAL YEARBOOK FOR GERMANY] 95 
(2000); Deutschland, in 2 RELIGION IN GESCHICHTE UND GEGENWART [RELIGION IN 
HISTORY AND CURRENT TIMES] 751 (4th ed. 1999). 
 36. For an updated list of churches and religious communities, as well as philosophical 
bodies with public law status, see the website of the Institute for European Constitutional Law 
at the University of Trier: <http://www.uni-trier.de/~ievr> (visited Feb. 15, 2001). 
 37. BVerwGE 105, 117. 
 38. BVerfG 19.12.2000 – 2 BvR 1500/97. See <http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidun-
gen/frames/rs20001219_2bvr150097>. 
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the constitution contained in Article 79.39 These include human 
dignity, the core principles of human rights, the rule of law, and state 
democracy. The religious organization must not endanger the 
fundamental rights of third persons. Finally, it must not infringe 
upon the fundamental principles of law concerning religion, based 
on the idea of freedom and established by the constitution. The law 
does not require any loyalty to the state extending further than that. 
Whether Jehovah’s Witnesses will obtain status as a public law 
corporation is still uncertain. The Federal Administrative Court must 
now determine whether this religious community would persistently 
act contrary to the law. For example, if Jehovah’s Witnesses 
endanger the well-being of children by their rules on education or if 
they coerce disaffected members into staying in the community, 
these practices would be considered contrary to law. 
There are some specific rights attached to the status of religious 
or philosophical public law corporations. They have the right to 
employ civil servants and to create public law things (res sacrae, 
etc.).40 The most obvious example of the rights attached to the 
public law status is a church’s right to tax its members. This tax 
functions like a membership fee. Those churches that do tax their 
members usually levy a tax of eight or nine percent of what the 
member pays in state income taxes. Some of the taxing churches use 
the state’s taxation system, i.e., the state machinery collects the 
church tax. For this service, a churches pays four to five percent of its 
tax revenue to the state. Indeed, the church tax system was 
introduced to de-establish former state churches in the nineteenth 
century and to force them to depend on their own income.41 The 
institution of church taxes is thus a consequence of state neutrality. 
 
 39. GG art. 79(III). 
 40. “Public law things” (öffentliche Sachen) is a special institution of German law 
meaning the dedication of means such as streets, places, furniture, books, or the like to public 
use, irrespective of civil law ownership. The dedication creates a special status of these things 
protecting the public use. For a discussion of the relationship between public law things and 
churches, see Dieter Schütz, Res sacrae, in 2 HANDBUCH DES STAATSKIRCHENRECHTS 
[HANDBOOK OF CIVIL ECCLESIASTICAL LAW] 3 (Joseph Listl & Dietrich Pirson eds., 2d ed. 
1995). 
 41. See Marré, supra note 22, at 1101. 
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2. Religious instruction in public schools 
The idea of religious instruction42 in public schools in Germany 
also follows from state neutrality. Religious instruction in public 
schools is offered as an ordinary subject by the state. Its content, 
however, is determined by the relevant religious communities, 
irrespective of their status as private or public law corporations. Thus 
Catholic religious instruction is provided for Catholic pupils, 
Protestant instruction for Protestants, Jewish instruction for Jews, 
and Islamic instruction for Muslims.43 As soon as a minimum 
number of pupils aggregate in a public school,44 the school must 
provide religious instruction funded by the state. There is no 
obligation to attend, for the pupils can opt out, and no teacher is 
obliged to teach contrary to his or her own religious convictions. 
The reasoning behind this system follows from the idea of state 
neutrality. Because the state makes schooling compulsory, the 
government takes much of the pupils’ time and energy. Indeed, the 
government takes over the responsibility for the children’s education 
in all aspects. As such, at least from the view of positive religious 
freedom, the state must also accommodate religious needs. 
Many say45 this system of providing religious instruction in public 
schools is a direct consequence of the idea of separation of church 
and state. Public education is based on the idea that the state has 
some responsibility to educate the upcoming generation. This 
responsibility stands alongside the right of the parents to raise their 
children according to their own convictions. An important purpose 
for religious education in public schools is the objective of 
integrating the population, of unifying the pluralistic and sometimes 
antagonistic society. 
Education is a process of developing the whole personality of a 
 
 42. See generally Gerhard Robbers, Art. 7, in 1 DAS BONNER GRUNDGESETZ, KOM-
MENTAR [THE BONN CONSTITUTION, COMMENTARY], supra note 21; Christoph Link, 
Religionsunterricht, in 2 HANDBUCH DES STAATSKIRCHENRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK 
DEUTSCHLAND [HANDBOOK OF CIVIL ECCLESIASTICAL LAW IN GERMANY], supra note 22, at 
439. 
 43. Regarding Islamic religious instruction, see BVerwG, DVBl. [DEUTSCHES VER-
WALTUNGSBLATT/GERMAN ADMIN J.] 1001 (2000); Martin Heckel, Religionsunterricht für 
Muslime? [Religious Instruction for Muslims?], JZ [JURISTENZEITUNG/JURIST’S J.] 74 (1999); 
see also infra Part III.C.2–3. 
 44. Anywhere from five to twelve pupils can constitute a sufficient minimum. 
 45. For references, see generally Link, supra note 42, at 503. 
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young human being. The purpose of education is not only to convey 
certain specific knowledge of facts and specific technical abilities, but 
to integrate a personality into a culture. This holistic understanding 
of education also encompasses religion. To form a personality also 
means to open the field of religious convictions and ideas to an 
individual. The religious side of a personality cannot be formed by 
merely confronting a youth with different ideas, leaving the decision 
completely to that person in a later age. Forming a personality within 
a religious life means to convey and accept a set of truths and deeply- 
rooted convictions. Embracing religion means to rely on certain 
truths. 
The necessity of teaching religion through religious convictions 
may be compared to teaching a language. A child in Spain does not 
learn how to speak by comparing all the different major languages in 
the world in order to one day be able to choose between all of them 
whichever one may best fit his or her convictions. Children in Spain 
are simply taught Spanish. Any other method would inhibit children 
from being able to speak at all. After the initial language is mastered, 
additional languages can be learned and explored. 
Teaching a child within one specific religion, however, poses a 
dilemma for the neutral state. The neutral state cannot implement 
religious truth, but has to be open to different religious ideas. 
Bearing the responsibility—along with parents—of forming the 
personality of the young person, the state has a duty to cultivate the 
religious side of the personality. Rejecting religion completely by 
pushing it aside to the evening hours or to Sundays, or in other ways 
ignoring the thirst for truth, would discriminate against religion. 
This again would lead to a compromise of state neutrality. Moreover, 
rejecting religion would mean to fail in the task of forming the whole 
personality of the child and of integrating important aspects of 
society. 
To achieve these goals, the state facilitates religious instruction in 
public schools, but allows the relevant religious communities to 
define its content. The religious organizations decide on the spiritual 
curriculum; they decide on truth. The state is obliged only to make 
religious instruction adequately available and to guarantee that no 
one is forced to take these courses. If it is truly voluntary, this 
cooperationist approach neatly separates church and state. 
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3. Religious communities and self-determination 
a. Principles of religious self-determination. Governmental 
neutrality also means nonintervention in the internal affairs of 
religious communities. All religious communities, regardless of their 
organizational status, enjoy very broad self-determination or 
autonomy. All enjoy a number of exemptions or special 
considerations with regard to labor laws, data protection laws, etc. 
The legal treatment of religious communities is somewhat similar to 
the treatment of tendency corporations, whose employees can be 
legally dismissed by the employer if they publicly contradict the 
opinions their employer represents. For example, a medical doctor 
was legally dismissed by a Catholic hospital in Germany when he 
advocated far-reaching abortion rights in a national newspaper and 
on television, while identifying his position in the Catholic hospital.46 
The religiously based employer is quite free to define the loyalty 
obligations of its employees in order to protect the employer’s public 
image. This latitude must be balanced against the employee’s 
freedom of expression. 
b. Limits to religious self-determination. Limitations to church 
self-determination are only those prescribed by a “law that applies to 
all.”47 There is some debate about the correct meaning of that 
limitation phrase. The Federal Constitutional Court has offered 
different explanations. 
The first attempt to elaborate the limitation clause amounts to a 
theory of spheres.48 The Court recognizes an inner sphere of church 
affairs insulated from matters of the state or secular society. The 
inner sphere would, for example, embrace the doctrines of the 
church. No state law may limit autonomy within this inner sphere. 
Outside this core, an outer sphere of church affairs embraces its 
 
 46. BVerfGE 70, 138; European Commission for Human Rights 06.09.1989 [Sept. 6, 
1989] BNr. 12242/86; Rommelfanger. 
 47. WRV art. 137(III); GG art. 140; Konrad Hesse, Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der 
Kirchen und Religionsgemeinschaften [The Right to Self-Determination of Churches and Reli-
gious Communities], in 1 HANDBUCH DES STAATSKIRCHENRECHTS DER BUNDES-REPUBLIK 
DEUTSCHLAND [HANDBOOK OF CIVIL ECCLESIASTICAL LAW IN GERMANY], supra note 22, at 
521; Alexander Hollerbach, Der verfassungsrechtliche Schutz kirchlicher Organisation [The Con-
stitutional Protection of Church Organization], in 6 HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS 
[HANDBOOK OF STATE LAW] 557 (Joseph Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., 1989). 
 48. BVerfGE 18, 385 (387); BVerfGE 42, 312 (334); BVerfGE 66, 1 (20); BVerfGE 
72, 278 (289). 
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interaction with public matters. Business activities, such as banking 
or insurance, fall into this sphere. State laws can limit church 
activities in this outer sphere in the same way as for any other 
purpose. 
Charmingly simple at first glance, this theory has provoked 
intense criticism. It is very difficult—probably impossible—to clearly 
distinguish these two spheres. Filling offices in the church would 
generally be regarded as a core question for the church. The 
question of women priests, imams, or rabbis, for example, raises 
important theological problems. Removing someone from church 
office—such as a Catholic priest who converts to Protestantism—
seems to be a matter of the inner sphere, but it would also clearly 
implicate state interests in protecting individuals from undue 
dismissal. 
The second attempt to elaborate the limitation clause is the so-
called “everyone clause.” It states that only those limitations on 
church autonomy are valid that affect churches or other religious 
communities in no other way than anyone else.49 Yet there are 
numerous laws that only affect the religious organizations or affect 
them specifically, and the constitutionality of these laws is 
undisputed. These laws concern, for example, church taxation, 
church subsidies, or religious instruction in public schools. Many 
laws impact churches differently than they impact other 
organizations. For instance, regulations on public noise affect church 
bell-ringing or imam prayer call. 
The third approach is the balancing theory—the prevailing “test” 
today. It approves of general laws that limit church autonomy only if 
they are necessary to guarantee the “compelling requirements” of 
peaceful coexistence in a society that is religiously neutral and 
respects the freedom of religious communities. Competing interests 
of church and state must be carefully balanced, leading, if possible, 
to an optimum for both.50 
 
 49. BVerfGE 42, 312 (334). 
 50. BVerfGE 53, 366 (401); BVerfGE 66, 1 (22); BVerfGE 70, 138 (167); BVerfGE 
72, 278 (289). 
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C. Equal Treatment 
1. The theory of equal treatment 
The third category of Germany’s law on religion is equal 
treatment. The rights of religious organizations do not depend on 
the state’s opinion of their creed. Indeed, the state is forbidden from 
judging the spiritual truth of any creed. All religions have similar 
rights, whether the organization is large or small, traditional or 
newly founded.51 There can be, however, certain variations according 
to the social importance of a group. Religious instruction in public 
schools requires a certain number of pupils of the same religious 
community.52 State collection of church taxes requires a certain 
number of members—25,000 in Bavaria or 40,000 in Northrhine-
Westfalia.53 In qualifying as a corporation under public law, the size 
of membership can indicate the organization’s prospects for 
permanency.54 
This is quite in line with the principle of equal protection. Taken 
seriously, the idea of equal rights makes possible a system of 
adequate attribution of positions. Equality does not mean identity, 
but adequacy, i.e., appropriate rights and positions. From the 
perspective of equality differences are possible as long as they are 
legitimate. Differences have to be based on legitimate reasons. 
2. Putting theory into practice: Islamic immigration and integration 
into Germany 
Probably the foremost challenge in German law on religion 
today is the need to integrate the large Islamic population. About 
three million Muslims live in Germany today. The most recent 
official statement about Muslims in Germany is found in an Answer 
of the Federal Government to the Parliamentary Question of the 
 
 51. Gerhard Robbers, Minority Churches in Germany, in THE LEGAL STATUS OF 
RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 153 (European 
Consortium for Church-State Research ed., 1994); Josef Jurina, Die Religionsgemeinschaften 
mit privatrechtlichem Rechtsstatus [Religious Communities with Private-law Status], in 1 
HANDBUCH DES STAATSKIRCHENRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [HAND-
BOOK OF CIVIL ECCLESIASTICAL LAW IN GERMANY], supra note 22, at 689. 
 52. See Robbers, supra note 42, at No. 144 . 
 53. See VON CAMPENHAUSEN, supra note 22, at 267. 
 54. WRV art. 137(V); GG art. 140. 
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Fraction of the CDU/CSU.55 The experience of integrating Islam 
on a large scale is new. The overwhelming majority of Muslims, 
primarily from Turkey, have immigrated into the country seeking 
work within the last four decades. Originally, immigrants were 
expected to return to their home country after finishing their work, 
but now many have decided to stay in Germany. In response, 
Germany’s law on religion will have to show its ability to integrate or 
will risk losing legitimacy. Christians and Muslims have long-
established and deeply rooted sets of values. In meeting, both must 
be open to adaptation to assure peaceful coexistence. Many cultural 
habits can result in social tensions. It is remarkable how few incidents 
of that kind have occurred. So far, xenophobia has not crystallized 
on religious questions. 
German law, like all European and North American law, is 
deeply influenced by Judeo-Christian ideas. To date, for the law, the 
most difficult aspect of handling Islam is its different cultural 
attitudes toward representation. Many public institutions must 
interact with someone who represents the community of believers in 
order to provide religious freedom. A representative is needed to 
form a public corporation, to establish the content of religious 
instruction in public schools, or to apply for an exception to animal 
protection laws that prohibit ritual slaughter.56 Considerable progress 
has been made as Muslims have organized themselves in Islamic 
associations and have achieved representation before government 
offices. However, there remains considerable fluctuation in terms of 
institutions and personnel. 
3. Islamic religious instruction in public schools 
Following a decision of the Federal Administrative Court, Islamic 
religious instruction as a distinct subject can now be offered in public 
schools in Berlin.57 This development will influence the situation in 
the other Länder; about 700,000 Islamic pupils attend German 
schools. 
In general, though, Islamic religious instruction is still taught 
differently from normal religious instruction in many public schools 
 
 55. BT-Drs., supra note 28, 14/4530 (08.11.2000) [Nov. 8, 2000]. 
 56. BVerwGE 99, 1; BVerwG (23.11.2000) [Nov. 23, 2000] – 3 C 40.99. 
 57. BVerwG DVBl. [DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATT/GERMAN ADMIN. J.] 1001 
(2000). 
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and thus deviates from the constitutional requirements. Since the 
need for Islamic religious instruction in public schools has become 
urgent in the last three decades, no representatives of Islam (who 
could determine the Islamic curriculum) have been accepted by the 
relevant Islamic population as legitimate. Meanwhile, in order to 
provide some Islamic instruction, it is taught as an integral part of 
the classes in Islamic culture and language that are offered in many 
public schools to enable Muslims, especially Turks, to remain rooted 
in their mother tongue and culture. Similar instruction is offered in 
Farsi and Arabic. In doing so, some Länder are cooperating with 
certain local Islamic associations in Germany to establish the relevant 
curricula, and others are cooperating with the Turkish consulates. 
Yet, this means that state authorities decide on curricula on religion 
contrary to the constitution, though at present it is as near to the 
constitutional requirements as possible. For the future one can hope 
that a number of Islam associations may prove representative enough 
to establish Islam curricula in order to introduce confessional Islamic 
religion instruction on a larger scale in complete conformity with the 
constitutional requirements. 
D. Background Convictions of Religious Freedom in Germany 
Three cultural convictions stand behind the current German 
system: the necessity of institutions for religious life, freedom of 
religion as a positive freedom, and the idea that religion is a positive 
factor in public life. These explain the current legal system in 
Germany regarding freedom of religion. 
First, religious freedom, though highly personal and individual, 
cannot do without institutions. Religion as a matter of social fact is a 
matter of community, exercised in community with others. 
Institutions are the framework, the basis, and the structure in which 
individual belief prospers. No legal order disregarding the 
institutional aspect of religious freedom can fully guarantee this 
human right. 
Second, religious freedom is adequately guaranteed as a positive 
freedom. The law must actively accommodate the religious 
convictions of the people. If government supports culture by 
providing theatres for the fine arts and supports fitness by providing 
stadiums and swimming pools, then the government must not 
discriminate against human religious needs just because they are 
religious. 
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Third, religion and philosophical creeds are regarded as a positive 
factor in public life. They have not only private but public standing, 
without being part of the state. German legal culture recognizes a 
public sphere, which is distinct from governmental or private 
spheres. 
IV. READY LAW AND REAL LIFE: CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES 
Like a number of other European states and organizations, 
Germany has conducted a parliamentary report on smaller and new 
religious communities.58 This report became an object of particular 
concern especially in the United States. Parliamentary reports were 
published in France, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Sweden, 
Germany, the European Union, and the Council of Europe.59 The 
German parliamentary report, compared to most of the other 
 
 58. BT-Drs. 13/10950, Neue religiöse und ideologische Gemeinschaften und 
Psychogruppen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland—Endbericht der Enquête-Kommission 
“Sogenannte Sekten und Psychogruppen” [New Religious and Ideological Communities and 
Psychological Groups in Germany—Final Report of the Enquête-Commission “So-Called 
Sects and Psychological Groups”] vom 9.6.1998 [from June 9, 1998]. 
 59. France: Rapport no. 2468 de M. Jacques Guyard, fait au nom de la commission 
d’enquête sur les sects, President M. Alain Gest, 22.12.1995 [(Parliamentary) Report No. 
2468 from Mr. Jacques Guyard, done in the name of the enquiry commission about the sects, 
President Mr. Alain Gest, Dec. 22, 1995]; Belgium: Rapport fait au nom de la commission 
d’enquête par Mm. Duquesne et Willems, Rapport de la Commission Parlamentaire belge 
d’enquête sur les Sectes [Report done in the name of the enquiry commission by Mr. 
Duquesne and Mr. Willems, Report of the Belgian parliamentary commission of enquiry into 
sects] 313/7 – 95/96; Spain: Sectas en España [Sects in Spain], Juan Manuel del Pozo Alva-
rez, III Legislatura [III legislation], Madrid 1989; Netherlands: Onderzock betreffende 
Sekten, Overheid en nieuwe religieuze bewegingen, Tobias A. M. Witteveen, Tweede Kamer 
der Staaten – Generaal, Vergaderjaar [Enquiry concerning sects, office of new religious 
movements, Tobias A. M. Witteveen, Second Chamber of the States-General, session year] 
1983–1984, Drucksache [Printed document] 16635, 1984; Italy: Sette religiose e nuovi 
movimenti magici in Italia, Ministero dell’ Interno, Dipartimento della Publica Sicurezza, 
Roma [Religious sects and new magic movements in Italy, Ministry of the Interior, 
Department of Public Security, Rome] 1998; Sweden: In Good Faith, Society and the new 
religious movements, Summary. SOU 1998: 113, at  <http://www.social.regeringen.se/ 
propositionerum/sou/pdf/sou98_113eng.pdf> (visited Mar. 15, 2001). European Union; EP 
EG No. C 078 of 18.3.1996, at 0031; Council of Europe: AS Jur (1998) 38 – 15.5.1998 – 
06–17, ajdoc 38.98. In the United Kingdom, there were government-initiated enquiries: Sir 
John Foster, Enquiring into the Practice and Effects of Scientology HMSO, 1971; Eileen 
Barker, New Religious Movements: A Practical Introduction, HMSO, 1989; see also Australia: 
Report of the Board of Enquiry into Scientology, Anderson, K. V., Q. C., State of Victoria, 
Australia 1965; New Zealand: Hubbard Scientology Organisation in New Zealand and any 
Associated Scientology Organizations or Bodies in New Zealand, Report of the Commission of 
Inquiry, Wellington 1969. 
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parliamentary reports, probably draws the least far reaching 
conclusions. It found that existing law was, on the whole, adequate 
to handle any specific dangers posed by those communities. Probably 
the most far reaching suggestion was to consider introducing 
criminal liability for legal persons. So far, the concept of criminal 
liability for legal persons is alien to German law. Introducing it 
would have implications by no means focused on religious 
communities. The report states explicitly that problems and dangers 
for individual believers (that might result from conflicts in their 
individual and social sphere) must be balanced against the individual 
and social benefit that people can experience in these religious 
groups. The report thus suggests interdisciplinary and independent 
research in the field of religious, ideological, and psychological 
phenomena.60 
Certainly one can doubt the necessity and perhaps the legitimacy 
of parliamentary reports on religious communities. The dangers are 
obvious. Governments could be tempted to make statements about 
the truth of the different doctrines contrary to state neutrality. 
Religious communities could feel attacked and intimidated by being 
publicly monitored. The fact of certain religious communities being 
the object of parliamentary scrutiny might deter individuals from 
joining such communities. 
The preliminary, interim report61 was by no means appropriate to 
ease such concerns. The final report, though, managed in general to 
avoided undue statements. The report, in order to avoid 
stigmatization, did not contain a list of relevant communities. 
The report would justify its monitoring of religious communities 
by the very duty of government to prevent public danger. The 
Federal Constitutional Court has upheld the government’s right to 
warn against dangers of religious communities.62 Reports of 
collective suicides or mass murder,63 and of child misuse in some 
 
 60. BT-Drs., supra note 57, 13/10950, 6.1/6.2. 
 61. BT-Drs. 13/8170. 
 62. BVerfG NJW [NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT/NEW LEGAL WKLY.] 3269 
(1989). 
 63. For example, the activities of Aum-Shinrikyô in Japan created widespread concern. 
Cf. R.J. Kisala, Reactions to Aum: The Revision of the Religious Corporation Law, in 22 
JAPANESE RELIGIONS 60–74 (1997); Charles Schwarzenegger, Über das Verhältnis von 
Religion, Sekten und Kriminalität, Eine Analyse der kriminologischen und strafrechtlichen 
Aspekte am Beispiel der japanischen Aum-Shinrikyô-Sekte [On the Relationship between Religion, 
Sects, and Crime, An Analysis of the Criminological and Criminal Law Aspects Based on the 
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religious communities had created widespread concern.64 The 
German parliamentary report in fact did focus somewhat on the 
psychological status of children in the relevant religious com-
munities. 
Many questions had arisen in German society as to whether 
certain smaller, new, unknown religious communities complied with 
the very basic requirements of a democratic and peaceful community 
under the rule of law. Reports, mostly from former members, 
alleging totalitarian and exploitative practices by religious com-
munities had gained public attention.65 German society, because of 
its experience with totalitarian, national-socialist rule, is very sensitive 
to the threat of any further totalitarianism. Nazi rule rapidly spread 
from a very small group with an intense ideology and belief to grasp 
hold of the whole country. A fundamental concern in German 
society is to ensure against that ever happening again. Being rightly 
attentive to this issue, however, may occasionally lead the govern-
ment to be somewhat oversensitive. 
In the end, the conclusions of the final parliamentary report 
almost completely assuaged public concern. The question was off the 
political agenda virtually overnight. Ultimately, the parliamentary 
report contributed intensively to religious tolerance in Germany. 
It may well be regarded as having been unwise of the report to 
somewhat single out the Church of Scientology. This report, 
however, must be considered in its contemporary context. At that 
time, intense public debate and probably undue excitement raged on 
all sides. In the time before the report was published, the Church of 
Scientology had distributed a pamphlet indicating its situation in 
Germany to be alike the persecution of the Jews under national-
socialism.66 This reproach was felt to be a gross and outrageous 
 
Example of the Japanese Aum-Shinrikyô Sect], in SEKTEN UND OKKULTISMUS, 
KRIMINOLOGISCHE ASPEKTE, REIHE KRIMINOLOGIE [SECTS AND OCCULTISM, 
CRIMINOLOGICAL ASPECTS, CRIMINOLOGICAL SERIES] 14 (Pierre-Henri Bolle et al. eds., 
1996). 
 64. ARBEITSGEMEINSCHAFT KINDERUND JUGENDSCHUTZ HAMBURG E.V.: SATAN-
ISMUS UND RITUELLER MIßBRAUCH, AKTUELLE ENTWICKLUNGEN UND KONSEQUENZEN 
FÜR DIE JUGENDHILFE [COMMITTEE FOR CHILD AND ADOLESCENT PROTECTION IN HAM-
BURG: SATANISM AND RITUAL ABUSE, CURRENT DEVELOPMENT AND CONSEQUENCES FOR 
THE PROTECTION OF YOUTH] (1996). 
 65. See ENTKOMMEN [ESCAPED] (1993). 
 66. HASS UND PROPAGANDA [HATE AND PROPAGANDA] (Church of Scientology 
International ed., 1993). 
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misuse of the deep suffering of millions; the Special Rapporteur for 
Religious Freedom of the United Nations, Abdelfatthah Amor 
rejected the comparison as childish.67 It was felt that the number of 
debatable decisions regarding the Church of Scientology and the 
reaction of the free press in Germany could not possibly compare in 
any reasonable way with the mass-murder and persecution 
committed under national-socialism. In its latest official statement 
about the Church of Scientology, which is under observation from 
the Constitution Protection Office (Bundesamt für Verfassungs-
schutz), the federal government declared it had no information about 
criminal activity by the Church of Scientology or its members in 
Germany or about the Church’s influence on the economy.68 
It is estimated that the Church of Scientology has about 8000 
adherents in Germany.69 The whole matter indeed raises central 
questions about the structures necessary for religious freedom to 
flourish in Germany. Obviously it is not a uniquely German problem. 
The Church of Scientology in Germany has not heretofore generally 
been accepted as a religious community.70 Since, in general, there is 
no registration process for religions in Germany, the question of the 
Church of Scientology’s status depends on the courts’ determination 
of cases involving religious matters. A number of court decisions 
concerning rather different cases71 relate to whether Scientology is a 
religion at all. Seemingly, lower courts have been more open to 
accept Scientology as a religion than have the higher courts. 
In 1984, a member of the Church of Scientology struggled to 
gain acknowledgment as a priest of that community. The status of 
priest would free him from compulsory military service, an 
exemption that applies to priests of all religious communities. The 
 
 67. Implementation of the Declaration of the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance 
and of Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief. Report submitted by Mr. Abdelfattah 
Amor, Special Rapporteur, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 
1996/23, Addendum, Visit to Germany: Commission on Human Rights 54th session 
E/CN.4/1998/6/Add.2. 
 68. BT-Drs. 14/4541 [Answer of the Federal Government to a Question of the 
Fraction of the CDU/CSU]. 
 69. See U.S. STATE DEP’T 2000 REPORT, supra note 1. 
 70. Gregor Thüsing, Ist Scientology eine Religionsgemeinschaft? [Is Scientology a Religious 
Organization?], 45 ZevKR [ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EVANGELISCHES KIRCHENRECHT/J. FOR 
PROTESTANT ECCLESIASTICAL L.] 592 (2000). 
 71. A list of court rulings concerning the Church of Scientology can be found at 
<http://www.uni-trier.de/~ievr> (visited April 30, 2001). 
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administrative court found him to be a priest. However, the Federal 
Administrative Court finally rejected his claim on the basis that the 
Church of Scientology was not a religious community.72 Most cases 
about the Church of Scientology’s status relate to economics, i.e., 
whether Scientology is a religion or a business. 
It is because of the comfortable, somewhat privileged situation of 
religion and religious communities in German law that some sort of 
definition is required as to what a religion would be in terms of the 
law. In a way, German law is at a loss to define religion as a legal 
term. The superior courts up to now mainly have decided the 
following way: Religion as well as ideological creed (Weltanschaung) 
is a certainty about specific statements about the whole of the world 
as well as about the source and the aim of the life of the human 
beings. Religion is based on a reality that is transcendent to the 
human being, whereas ideological creeds take to immanent 
explanations. An association is a religious or ideological association 
in the sense of the Basic Law, when its members or followers confess 
on the basis of a common religious or ideological conviction 
corresponding ideas about the meaning and the accomplishment of 
human life.73 The Federal Constitutional Court, reluctant to give a 
definition of religion within the last years, has held the following 
about the range of the freedom of religion clause: in order to define 
what a religion is, the self-perception of the relevant believer is of 
major importance for the Court’s decision. In a system in which legal 
consequences are attributed to the status of religion, though, the 
law, and thus the courts and the state, must have the final decision.74 
V. APPROACHES TO SECURING FREEDOM OF RELIGION 
Today, there seem to be two ways to secure human rights: a 
monitoring approach and a structural approach. The monitoring 
approach surveys various countries to detect any breach of human 
rights. Findings are reported to publicly expose misconduct. It can 
be effective in individual cases, and, if consequently performed, it 
might well contribute to general keeping in line. This approach 
 
 72. BVerwG NJW 393 (1985). 
 73. BVerwGE 89, 368/370; BVerwGE 90, 112/115 f.; BAG JZ 1995, 951/952. 
 74. BVerfGE 83, 341; cf. Gerhard Robbers, Staat und Religion [State and Religion] in 
59 VVDStRL [VERÖFFENTLICHUNGEN DER VEREINIGUNG DER DEUTSCHEN STAATS-
RECHTSLEHRER/PUBLICATIONS OF ASS’N OF GERMAN ST. L. TCHRS.] 231 (2000). 
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resembles the approach of a court or prosecutor. It attempts to effect 
positive change quickly, and it is a short term perspective. 
Alternatively, the structural approach essays to integrate the 
human rights perspective into the legal and social structures of a 
culture. This more cooperative approach attempts to work from 
where the people concerned are. This opens a more long-term 
perspective, trying to get to the roots. It seeks not to threaten, but 
to convince. Like other freedoms, religious freedom cannot be 
adequately described in isolation. This thread weaves into a fabric of 
freedoms and interests. Freedom of internal belief is undisputed and 
unproblematic. Freedom to act according to one’s belief leads to 
friction. This scope of freedom is limited by other persons’ freedoms, 
the interests of community and state, and cultural circumstances. 
The difficulty in balancing competing interests within one’s own 
cultural tradition multiplies when one looks at foreign cultures. 
Values change, different historical, social, and cultural requirements 
evolve. Restrictions that seem incidental or even illegitimate in one 
setting may be substantial and legitimate elsewhere. 
A. The European Approach to Religious Freedom 
There seems to be a deep difference in some contemporary 
American approaches to religious freedom and the prevailing 
German and European approaches. This difference does have some 
intense consequences, not so much in Germany and Western 
Europe, but in Eastern Europe. 
The prevailing European approach tends to ask whether or not 
religious groups can adequately live their religion. The inquiry 
encompasses aspects such as social life, holidays and celebrations, 
education, and military chaplainry. In Europe, the governments assist 
in these aspects where necessary and permissible. Funding for 
cultural and social activities of religious communities is possible as 
well. In this approach, missionary work belongs to religion as one 
part of the entire structure. It is a broad meaning of religious 
freedom. 
B. The Marketplace Model 
The other approach experienced in Europe as a predominantly 
American one is somewhat different. It could be called a marketplace 
approach of religious freedom. The main question seems to be how 
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to convince as many people as possible of one’s own truths. It is a 
basically proselytizing idea of religious freedom, drawn from the idea 
of competition. It is clear that the latter approach can be viewed as a 
threat by the old, well situated, socially predominant religions. This 
is especially the case when the new proselytizing religion can spend a 
lot of money, when it can promise not only truth and tradition, but 
economic forthcoming, better standard of living, and world travel. 
That idea of a free marketplace itself is at stake, and with it the idea 
of fair competition, if from the very beginning some of the 
competitors have all the money, all the economic resources, and the 
other competitors have none. Needless to say, this not only threatens 
the traditional religions, but is also an economic and cultural factor 
of opening markets. 
In the marketplace view of religious freedom, the principle of 
equal treatment is paramount. Any differences in treatment of 
religious groups, any special registering of religious groups, any 
different calibration according to size or social influence, any 
reasoning drawn from the historical dominance of certain religious 
denominations are immediately suspect. Any such distinctions are 
decried, not merely as matters of religious discrimination, but as 
assaults on religious freedom itself. 
C. Religious Liberty as a Positive Freedom 
The situation becomes more complicated when religious 
freedom is understood as a positive freedom. This means that 
religion is actively given room by public authorities to flourish. As 
soon as religion is actively given a public role it is necessary to 
distinguish and to ask for criteria of distribution of means. 
For example, when church representatives sit on boards of youth 
protection or public broadcasting stations, when they act as advisors 
in parliament’s lawmaking process, when they shape religious 
education in public schools, or when they serve as military chaplains, 
they cannot do so in precise demographic proportions. How is exact 
numerical representation possible when certain religious groups 
consist of a handful of individuals—sincere and religious though they 
may be? Enlarging the system of public representation to absolute 
inclusion would bloat institutions to an enormous and unworkable 
size. 
Smaller, newer religious groups will tend to view a system not 
based on the idea of identical rights as discriminatory, and thus 
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contrary to religious freedom. The alternative is to sever religion 
from the public institutions. This would certainly stunt positive 
religious freedom. Moreover, it would undermine the concept of 
democratic statehood: the will of the people determines the shape 
and content of the legal system. If religious orientation were stripped 
from the “will of the people,” this will would cease to represent its 
constituents. 
D. Germany’s Experience 
In Germany, representatives of the Catholic, Protestant, and 
Jewish constituencies, together with certain civic groups, hold seats 
on advisory boards and committees that relate to pluralistic 
representation and ethical issues. For example, boards on youth 
protection censor or classify pornographic literature; other boards 
govern public broadcasting institutions. Their purpose is to interpose 
a layer of public, yet not governmental, institutions between the 
private individual and the state. Today, up to 150,000 Jewish 
individuals live in Germany, a comparatively small number due to the 
Nazi murder of the Jewish people. The Jewish faith communities 
thus are not as much represented in terms of number, but rather in 
terms of culture and history. To offer them participation is a moral 
duty in Germany today—it is a thought unthinkable to first kill 
millions and then deprive the survivors of their share in repre-
sentation, arguing they would be too few. These are different aspects 
of equality in Germany than those that exist in other countries in 
Europe and the world. 
To safeguard religious liberty, the correct paradigm is equal 
rights, not identical rights. The paradigm of identical rights cannot 
appreciate the societal function of a religion, its historical impact, or 
its cultural background. Identical rights would preclude a multitude 
of manifestations of positive religious freedom. For instance, if an 
identical right to sit on youth protection boards was granted to each 
and every religious denomination, any utility of these boards would 
be crushed by their enormity. The only other way to achieve all 
inclusive representation would require trampling another religious 
right to achieve proportional representation. It would require 
compelling all religious denominations to organize a national board 
to nominate common delegates. This outcome—identical, all-
inclusive representation by government decree—would establish a 
civil religion. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Religious freedom is safeguarded by a large number of provisions 
in German law that protect individual as well as collective and 
corporate freedom. The German idea of religious freedom views this 
right as a positive freedom, and the government is obliged to give 
adequate room to actively live one’s religion. The system thus 
established is structured by religious freedom, state neutrality, and 
equal treatment of religions. It guarantees far reaching self-
determination of religious associations. The special status of some 
religious communities as corporations under public law, and the 
ability to engage in religious instruction in public schools are in full 
accordance with these requirements. The most important challenge 
for Germany’s law on religion is the need to integrate large numbers 
of Islamic immigrants into the system.  Gratefully, many positive 
steps have been taken to achieve this goal. Equal treatment of 
religion does not require identical, but adequate and proportional 
rights for all religions. Freedom of religion requires more than the 
mere idea of a free marketplace of religions. It requires room for 
actively living one’s religion in all its aspects, with religion being 
positively integrated in law and society. 
Securing human rights requires more than the monitoring of 
other countries—it requires an understanding of different cultures. 
Monitoring, indeed, is necessary, as it identifies specific problem 
areas. There are certainly problems in Germany—indeed, how else 
could it be in a community of 82 million people? A fair evaluation 
requires a vision of the whole picture. Any concern about specific 
problems must be considered a concern about religious freedom in 
general. Concern about home politics or about political or economic 
influence abroad should not blur the screen. Religious freedom 
flourishes best in legal and social structures, in atmospheres, in 
longer-term implementation. 
Religious freedom will grow, but only in community with 
churches and other religious communities, and only with respect of 
regional experience, traditions, and contemporary and future needs. 
Protection of human rights is not a one-sided protection of mere 
individual interests; it involves individuals and community, and must 
balance often conflicting interests. This balance cannot be modeled 
in abstracts, and there are no pre-formulated concepts that could 
ever work. This balance to be brought about requires knowledge of 
the specific traits of the people concerned, of their aims and needs, of 
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their historical experiences and emotions, of their values and fears, 
and it will only succeed with openness to new developments. 
